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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
I. STATUTORY RESIDENT BIDDER PREFERENCE IS
CONSTITUTIONAL
In Gary Concrete Products, Inc. v. Riley1 the South Caro-
lina Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a resident
bidder preference section in the South Carolina Procurement
Code.2 This provision, section 11-35-1520(9)(d) of the South
Carolina Code,3 favors State residents when the State purchases
supplies, services, and goods; The supreme court affirmed the or-
der of the trial judge and upheld this relatively new code section
against equal protection and commerce clause challenges.
4
The appellant, Gary Concrete Products (Gary), a Georgia
corporation which manufactures and sells reinforced concrete
pipe, submitted bids for purchases by the State of South Caro-
lina. Although Gary was the lowest bidder in several counties,
the State awarded the contracts for those counties to resident
bidders as authorized by Code section 11-35-1520(9)(d).
Gary alleged that this preference section violated the com-
merce clause of the United States Constitution 5 by imposing an
unlawful burden on interstate commerce. The court, relying pri-
marily on Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp.6 and Reeves, Inc.
v. Stake," reasoned that the commerce clause does not limit a
1. 285 S.C. 498, 331 S.E.2d 335 (1985).
2. S.C. CODE ANN. § 11-35-1520(9)(d) (1986)(effective July 31, 1981) provides in part:
Competitive procurements made by any governmental body shall be made
from a responsive and responsible vendor resident in South Carolina: (i) for
procurements under $2,500,000 if such bid does not exceed the lowest qualified
bid from a nonresident vendor by more than two per cent of the latter bid, and
if such resident vendor has made written claim for such preference at the time
the bid was submitted ....
S.C. CODE ANN. § 11-35-1520(9)(d) (1986).
3. S.C. CODE ANN. § 11-35-1520(9)(d) (1986).
4. 285 S.C. at 506, 331 S.E.2d at 339-40.
5. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
6. 426 U.S. 794 (1976)(nothing in the commerce clause forbids a state, in the ab-
sence of congressional action, from participating in the market and exercising the right
to favor its own citizens over others).
7. 447 U.S. 429 (1980)(the commerce clause is aimed principally at limiting state
1
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state's ability to operate freely within a market or to favor its
own citizens over others when the state is acting as a market
participant.8 Recognizing that a state may not impose conditions
that have a substantial regulatory effect outside the market in
which the state is a participant,9 the court in Gary Concrete
concluded that the State was merely choosing its trading part-
ners to favor residents. The court found no market regulation
and considered the factual situation to be consistent with
Reeves. Consequently, the court held that the Board's actions
and the preference section were not subject to commerce clause
scrutiny.10
Gary also contended that the preference section violated the
equal protection clause of both the United States and the South
Carolina Constitutions. The majority of the court relied upon
State ex rel. Medlock v. South Carolina Family Farm Develop-
ment Authority11 in denying the plaintiff's equal protection
claim. In Medlock the court stated the three requirements that
are necessary to satisfy equal protection. First, the classification
must bear a reasonable relation to the legislative purpose sought
to be effected. Second, the members of the class must be treated
alike under similar circumstances and conditions. Last, the clas-
sification must rest on some reasonable basis. 2
The court in Gary Concrete found that the first require-
ment was satisfied because the classification between residents
and nonresidents bore a reasonable relation to the legislative
purpose of directing benefits from State purchases to those citi-
zens and taxpayers who funded the State treasury.13 The court
also deemed the second requirement satisfied. Although Gary al-
leged differential treatment between two groups of nonresidents,
the court found that those groups were not similarly situated
since one group was legitimately favored under the preference
taxes and regulatory measures that impede free private trade in the national market
place and does not limit the ability of the states themselves to operate freely in the free
market).
8. 285 S.C. at 501, 331 S.E.2d at 337.
9. Id. at 503, 331 S.E.2d at 338 (citing South-Central Timber Dev. v. Wunnicke, 467
U.S. 82 (1984)).
10. 285 S.C. at 503, 331 S.E.2d at 338.
11. 279 S.C. 316, 306 S.E.2d 605 (1983).
12. Id. at 321, 306 S.E.2d at 609 (citing Bauer v. S.C. Housing Auth., 271 S.C. 219,
246 S.E.2d 869 (1978)).
13. 285 S.C. at 505, 331 S.E.2d at 339.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
section because of its taxpaying status.1'4 The court then ad-
dressed the third requirement, noting that the legislature should
decide whether the classification is reasonable and that the court
will not set aside that determination unless it is plainly
arbitrary. 5
Generally, the primary purpose of competitive bidding stat-
utes is to obtain the advantages of free and fair competition and
to secure the best work or supplies at the lowest price practica-
ble. 1 6 Public officers are, therefore, frequently charged to award
state contracts to the lowest responsible bidder." Competitive
bidding statutes, however, may require the granting of a prefer-
ence to bidders in particular categories.
For example, in Schrey v. Allison Steel Manufacturing
Co.'8 the plaintiff claimed a preference under a statutory provi-
sion providing that contractors who had paid state and county
taxes for two successive years immediately prior to bid submis-
sion were to be given a five percent advantage over nontaxpay-
ing contractors.' 9 The Supreme Court of Arizona held that this
statutory preference withstood allegations that it violated the
equal protection clause. The court reasoned that Arizona, in
contracting for the expenditure of tax money, had a reasonable
basis for granting a preference to taxpaying contractors who had
made a contribution to the funds from which they were to reap a
benefit.2 0
Similarly, in Equitable Shipyards, Inc. v. State Depart-
ment of Transportation2 ' a foreign shipbuilder brought an ac-
tion challenging the constitutionality of a bidding preference
statute's application to the awarding of a ferry construction con-
tract. The statute established a preference for shipbuilding firms
located in the State of Washington as long as their bids did not
exceed by more than six percent the lowest comparable bid of
14. Id. at 506, 331 S.E.2d at 339.
15. Id. at 504, 331 S.E.2d at 338.
16. Equitable Shipyards v. State Dep't of Transp., 93 Wash. 2d 465, 473, 611 P.2d
396, 401 (1980).
17. State ex rel Capital Business Equip. v. Gates, 155 W. Va. 64, 180 S.E.2d 865
(1971).
18. 75 Ariz. 282, 255 P.2d 604 (1953).
19. Id. at 285, 255 P.2d at 606. The statute addressed the allocation of contracts for
public work to be performed on behalf of the state.
20. Id. at 287, 255 P.2d at 607.
21. 93 Wash. 2d 465, 611 P.2d 396 (1980).
1986]
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any shipbuilding firm located outside the state.22 The Supreme
Court of Washington identified the underlying policy of the stat-
ute as granting a preference to those who contribute to the econ-
omy through construction activities within the State.2 Since the
preference statute was closely allied with economic legislation,
the court deemed rational basis scrutiny appropriate. The Wash-
ington court held that a rational relationship existed between
the purposes of the preference statute and its classifications of
in-state and out-of-state shipbuilding firms.24
The dissent in Gary opined that the preference section vio-
lated the equal protection clause because it conflicted with ex-
press legislative purposes of the South Carolina Procurement
Code. State competitive bidding statutes must be construed to
ascertain and effectuate the legislative intent expressed in the
statutes. 26 Because the purpose relied upon by the majority in
Gary Concrete is not expressly set forth in the purposes section
of the statute, the appellant's claim and the dissenting opinion
appear to be justified.
The Gary Concrete decision is, however, consistent with
precedents from other jurisdictions, such as Schrey and Equita-
ble Shipyards. Although the court inferred a purpose not ex-
pressly found in the statute-directing benefits from State pur-
chasers to State taxpayers-the decision appears to be correct.
Glenn R. Goodwin
I. BUSINESS OPPORTUNITY SALES ACT UPHELD
In Tousley v. North American Van Lines, Inc.27 the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals held that South Carolina's Business
22. Id. at 468-69, 611 P.2d at 399.
23. Id. at 478, 611 P.2d at 404.
24. Id.; see also Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113 (1940)(government enjoys
the unrestricted power to fix the terms and conditions upon which it will make needed
purchases); Heim v. McCall, 239 U.S. 175 (1915); City of Denver v. Bossie, 83 Colo. 329,
266 P. 214 (1928)("the State may buy of whom it will"); Cunningham's Ski Shop v.
Berle, 96 Misc. 2d 137, 408 N.Y.S.2d 938 (Sup. Ct. 1978).
25. 285 S.C. at 506-07, 331 S.E.2d at 340 (Gregory, J., dissenting); see S.C. CODE
ANN. §§ 11-35-20(c), (e), (f) (1986).
26. See, e.g., McMillen Feed Mills v. Mayer, 265 S.C. 500, 510-11, 220 S.E.2d 221,
226 (1975).
27. 752 F.2d 96 (4th Cir. 1985).
[Vol. 38
4
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 1 [], Art. 5
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol38/iss1/5
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Opportunity Sales Act (BOSA)2s was not preempted by the In-
terstate Commerce Act (ICA) 9 and did not violate the com-
merce clause of the United States Constitution." The court also
declined to allow recovery of punitive damages under BOSA.
3 1
David Tousley, responding to a newspaper advertisement,
attended a seminar in Spartanburg presented by a recruiting
representative of North American Van Lines. At the seminar,
the representative told Tousley that as an owner-operator for
North American he could expect a net income of $16,000 to
$19,000 per year.3 2 The next day Tousley paid the representative
$400 to enroll in North American's driver training school in In-
diana. While at the school, Tousley purchased a truck and en-
tered into a security agreement and contract with North Ameri-
can. Tousley hauled freight for the company for two years, but
realized "considerably less income" than the amounts stated by
the representative. 3 Tousley terminated his relationship with
North American, and being unable to refinance the truck, he
consented to its repossession by the company. He then insti-
tuted an action based on common-law fraud and violations of
BOSA. A district court denied recovery for fraud,34 but found
North American in violation of BOSA.3 Tousley was awarded
$1200 treble damages, $5000 punitive damages, and $22,500 in
attorney's fees.
On appeal North American first contended that the ICA 3
and its regulations showed congressional intent to preempt the
28. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 39-57-10 to -80 (1976). BOSA requires those who sell business
opportunities in South Carolina to register with the Secretary of State in order to pro-
vide the purchaser of such an opportunity with relevant information, S.C. CODE ANN. §§
39-57-30, -50 (1976), to post a security bond or establish a trust account, S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 39-57-40, and requires that the written contract between the parties contain certain
information and that a copy of the contract be given to the purchaser. S.C. CODE ANN. §
39-57-70 (1976).
29. 49 U.S.C. §§ 10,101-11,901 (1982).
30. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
31. 752 F.2d at 104-05.
32. 752 F.2d at 99. Tousley was also told that his gross income before expenses
should be $71,000. In addition, North American offered to train Tousley as a driver, sell
him a truck, and dispatch him and his truck to locations where he could pick up freight
for transportation. Id.
33. Id. at 99-100.
34. Id. at 100 n.5.
35. Id. at 99.
36. See 49 U.S.C. § 11,107 and its pursuant regulations, infra note 42.
1986]
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regulation of the trucking industry. The preemption argument
has its roots in the supremacy clause of the United States Con-
stitution.3 7 Such a preemption may either be explicit s or evi-
denced by clear congressional intent.3 9 The Tousley court used a
two-tiered inquiry to determine if the regulation of the industry
had been preempted by the ICA. The court determined whether
Congress in passing the statute intended to occupy the field.
Second, the court considered whether the state statute was void
because it conflicted with federal regulation.40
In looking at section 11,107 of the ICA41 and its regula-
tions,42 the court of appeals found that "no pervasive regulatory
scheme or dominant federal interest" existed in regulating mat-
ters covered by BOSA because the state act only applied to
"pre-contractual activities,"4 3 which were not covered by the
federal act. The court also rejected North American's contention
that the Interstate Commerce Commission had determined, in
adopting 49 C.F.R. section 1057.12(i), 44 that negotiations of vehi-
37. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2. This clause has been held to invalidate state laws that
"interfere with or are contrary to, the laws of congress. . . ." Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S.
(9 Wheat.) 1, 211 (1824).
33. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963); Rice v. Santa Fe
Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947).
39. 331 U.S. at 230. The Tousley court stated that this congressional intent may be
evidenced by a "scheme of federal regulation so pervasive" as to infer that there is no
room for state regulation or by a dominant federal interest in the field. 752 F.2d at 101
(citing Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 157 (1978)). The Tousley court also
stated that if the field is not preempted by pervasive regulation, preemption may still
occur if "there is an 'irreconcilable conflict between federal and state standards.'" 752
F.2d at 101 (quoting Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 256 (1984)).
40. 752 F.2d at 101 (citing Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 256). North American conceded
that the ICA did not explicitly prevent South Carolina from regulating the sale or leasing
of trucks within the state. 752 F.2d at 100.
41. 49 U.S.C. § 11,107(a)(1)-(4) (1982).
42. 49 C.F.R. § 1057 (1985). These regulations "impose lease requirements, includ-
ing that the agreements be in writing, that receipts identifying equipment be given, that
certain records be kept, that terms of compensation be clearly specified, and that insur-
ance requirements be met." 752 F.2d at 101.
43. 752 F.2d at 101.
44. Section 1057.12(i) provides:
The lease shall specify that the lessor is not required to purchase or rent any
products, equipment, or services from the authorized carrier as a condition of
entering into the lease agreement. The lease shall specify the terms of any
agreement in which the lessor is a party to an equipment purchase or rental
contract which gives the authorized carrier the right to make deductions from
the lessor's compensation for purchase or rental payments.
49 C.F.R. § 1057.12(i) (1985).
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cle lease agreements were to be free from governmental regula-
tions. The court read the Commission's statements45 as evidence
that "the agency appears to be declining to regulate [the precon-
tractual] aspect of leasing arrangements."4 The court stated
that when the federal government declined to regulate an area,
"the state retains 'the implied reservation of power to fill out the
scheme.' ",47 Thus, the court found no congressional intent in the
ICA to occupy the field of truck leasing to the exclusion of
BOSA.48
In addressing North American's contention that BOSA spe-
cifically conflicted with the purpose and objectives of the ICA,
the Tousley court sought to discern the purposes behind the po-
tentially conflicting statutes. The court determined that section
11,107 and its regulations were intended to encourage truth-in-
leasing by disclosure of certain information at the time of leas-
ing; whereas, BOSA was intended to regulate conduct of a seller
prior to execution of an agreement.49 The court found that the
requirements of the South Carolina statutes complimented
rather than conflicted with the ICA truth-in-leasing policy by
facilitating true arm's-length transactions."
North American next contended that BOSA violated the
commerce clause of the United States Constitution. 1 The Tous-
ley court held that BOSA did not provide for direct state regula-
tion of interstate commerce. The court noted that BOSA was
enacted to serve a legitimate public interest and implied that
any regulation of interstate commerce was incidental and, thus,
45. The court considered the following statements of the Commission:
The intent of the rule is not to prohibit freely negotiated sales or rental trans-
actions between carrier lessees and their lessors. The thrust of the rule is only
to prohibit lessees from imposing sales or rental agreements on lessors as a pre-
condition to leasing arrangements . . . . Lessors and lessees are still com-
pletely free to bargain at arm's length and negotiate the sale or rental of any
products, equipment, or services.
752 F.2d at 102 (quoting Lease and Interchange of Vehicles, ex parte No. MC-43 (Sub-
No. 7), 131 M.C.C. 141, 156 (1979)).
46. Id.
47. Id. (citing KVUE, Inc. v. Austin Broadcasting Corp., 709 F.2d 922, 934 (5th Cir.
1983)).
48. 752 F.2d at 102.
49. Id. at 102-03.
50. Id. at 103.
51. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 states: "Congress shall have power ... [t]o regulate
commerce . . . among the several states."
1986]
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permitted.52 The court also found that although Tousley's train-
ing and the execution of the contract and security agreement
took place outside of South Carolina, "the pre-contractual con-
duct implicated in this case ' ' 53 was completed within the State.
Thus, North American's contention that BOSA regulated busi-
ness practices outside the state in violation of the commerce
clause was also found to be without merit.
After deciding that North American's activities were not ex-
empted from regulation by the South Carolina Unfair Trade
Practices Act (UTPA)5 4 and that the company's liability for vio-
lations of BOSA was a factual question properly submitted to
the jury, the Tousley court addressed the issue of damages. The
court found that the district court properly trebled the $400 of
actual damages awarded by the jury.2 The court, however, re-
versed the award of $5000 punitive damages by holding that the
award of treble damages under UTPA "would seem to comprise
the entire statutory damage scheme." '56 The court stated that if
the legislature had intended that punitive damages be recover-
able for a violation of BOSA, the Act would have specifically
provided for them. 57 Finally, the court upheld the awarding of
$22,500 in attorney's fees to Tousley.
Because Tousley is the first federal decision concerning the
application of South Carolina's BOSA, it is important for any
guidelines that it gives for the future application of the Act. The
52. 752 F.2d at 103. The court quoted Edgar v. Mite Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982),
which stated that a "state statute must be upheld if it regulates even-handedly to effec-
tuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only
incidental .... " Id. at 640 (quoting Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142
(1970)).
53. The conduct referred to included the advertising, recruiting, and initial payment
of $400. 752 F.2d at 103.
54. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 39-5-20 to -160 (1976). Under S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-57-80(e)
(1976), the violation of any BOSA provision an unfair trade practice under § 39-5-40 of
the UTPA. The Tousley court held that § 39-5-40, which exempts transactions "permit-
ted under laws administered by any regulatory body or officer acting under statutory
authority of... the United States .. .," from the UTPA, did not apply since BOSA
dealt with pre-contractual activities not covered by the ICA. 752 F.2d at 104.
55. 752 F.2d at 104-05. The UTPA provides that if a violation is wilful or knowing
the court has the discretion to treble the actual damages. S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-140(a)
(1976).
56. 752 F.2d at 104.
57. Id. The court cited the following statutes as specifically allowing punitive dam-
ages: S.C. CODa ANN. § 56-15-110(3) (1976)(violation of motor vehicle dealers regula-
tions); S.C. CoDE ANN. § 15-69-210 (action to recover possession of personal property). Id.
[Vol. 38
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court's reasoning, in holding that BOSA is not preempted by the
ICA, appears to be correct. The ICA does not attempt to regu-
late the precontractual activities covered by BOSA.5 8 One possi-
ble exception not recognized by the court is section 39-57-70 of
BOSA.59 This statute requires that business opportunity con-
tracts be in writing and contain certain required information. In
addition, the statute requires that a copy of the contract be
given to the purchaser upon signing.6 0 These requirements do
not appear to fit into the "pre-contractual" category; rather,
they affect the form of the contract itself. Therefore, this statute
may be subject to preemption by federal statutes or regulations
that detail contractual requirements. The ultimate outcome of
Tousley would not have been affected by this omission because
other violations of BOSA provisions dealing with precontractual
activities were present."1
In addition, the Tousley court's holding that punitive dam-
ages were not contemplated by BOSA could have an effect be-
yond the instant case. If South Carolina courts adopt the Fourth
Circuit's reasoning, any state statute that does not specifically
allow punitive damages may be read as excluding such damages.
It is clear from BOSA's language that if North American had
been found liable for common-law fraud, punitive damages
would have been allowed.6 2 The Tousley court appears to have
interpreted the statutory language that the "purchaser. . .shall
not be entitled to unjust enrichment by exercising the remedies
provided in this subsection"63 to prohibit the recovery of actual
damages more than once. This would explain why the court only
trebled the $400 in actual damages rather than allowing Tousley
to recover $400 in actual damages for the BOSA violation and
$400 damages as a result of an unfair trade practice which could
have been trebled under section 39-5-140(a).
58. See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
59. S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-57-70 (1976).
60. Id.
61. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-57-30 (1976), which requires a seller to make written
disclosures to a purchaser at least 48 hours prior to the execution of a business opportu-
nity contract or at least 48 hours prior to the receipt of any consideration by the seller,
whichever occurs first.
62. S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-57-80(d) (1976) provides: "The remedies provided herein
shall be in addition to any other remedies provided for by law or equity."
63. S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-57-80(a).
1986]
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Tousley, therefore, is important in establishing the validity
of the Business Opportunity Sales Act. The court's holding that
BOSA does not violate the commerce clause may have a far-
reaching effect. A contrary decision could have made BOSA inef-
fective except in cases in which all activities take place within
the State. While holding that BOSA does not directly regulate
interstate commerce, the court left open the question of the per-
missible extent of regulation that BOSA may impose on business
practices which take place partially out of state.6 4 Because of the
paucity of judicial precedent construing the Act, however, the
exact parameters of BOSA have yet to be determined.
James Michael Magee
III. DUAL RATE SCHEME PURSUANT TO SPECIAL LEGISLATION
In Duke Power Co. v. South Carolina Public Service Com-
mission65 the South Carolina Supreme Court held that Act 1293
of 1966,66 which created a dual rate structure for electricity users
in Greenwood County as part of the County's sale of its electri-
cal system to Duke Power Company, was not unconstitutional
special legislation. The court, however, implicitly reaffirmed its
willingness to strike down legislation which it considers "spe-
cial."'6 7 Thus, South Carolina remains among jurisdictions that
construe their state constitutional admonishments against spe-
cial legislation as prohibitory rather than "cautionary" and "ad-
visory." ' The case is a good example of the court's willingness
in certain situations to uphold a law that is manifestly "special"
or "local."69
In 1965 the Duke Power Company offered to buy Green-
wood County's electrical system from the Greenwood County
64. The court would impliedly allow some "incidental" regulation of out-of-state
business activities but would prohibit any regulation of activities that take place "wholly
outside the state's borders." 752 F.2d at 103.
65. 284 S.C. 81, 326 S.E.2d 395 (1985).
66. 1966 S.C. Acts 3294, No. 1293, § 4, subsection 3.
67. 284 S.C. at 91, 326 S.E.2d at 400-01.
68. See J.L. Underwood, Separate but Inseparable: The Constitutional Relationship
Among the Branches of the South Carolina Government 65 (1985)(unpublished manu-
script)(citing Powell v. Durden, 61 Ark. 21, 31 S.W. 740 (1895)).
69. 284 S.C. at 91-93, 326 S.E.2d at 401-02.
[Vol. 38
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Electric Power Commission. The Power Commission, created by
South Carolina statute, did not have the authority to sell the
system.70 The South Carolina General Assembly, therefore,
passed Act 1293 of 1966, which authorized the sale based on cer-
tain conditions, one of which included the following language:
The rates to be charged for ... all connections which ex-
ist at the consummation of the sale shall be the lower of the
rates charged by the Greenwood County Electric Power Com-
mission and Duke Power Company and the same shall not be
grounds for any claim alleging discrimination. The rates to be
charged for electric power for connections after the date of the
sale shall be the applicable rates of Duke Power Company
71
The dispute in Duke Power centered around this particular
provision since it effectively froze rates at the 1966 level for cer-
tain Greenwood County residents who were connected to the old
system in 1966. Ratepayers coming onto the system after 1966
paid Duke's systemwide rate. In 1981 Duke's rate was 220% to
350% greater than the rate had been in 1966. This rate increase
resulted in adjacent residents paying vastly different rates for
electricity.72
On January 26, 1981, Duke applied to the Public Service
Commission (PSC) for a rate increase covering those Greenwood
residents still on the frozen 1966 rates.73 The PSC dismissed the
application for lack of jurisdiction based on Act 1293 of 1966.74
The circuit court affirmed, and the South Carolina Supreme
Court upheld the circuit court's ruling in a three-to-two deci-
sion.75 On appeal Duke Power argued, inter alia,'76 that the por-
70. 1934 S.C. Acts 2020, No. 1095; 1939 S.C. Acts 544, No. 329. These acts empow-
ered Greenwood County to borrow funds to finance its electric system and created the
Power Commission. The statutes did not, however, give the Commission authority to sell
the property. 284 S.C. at 86, 326 S.E.2d at 398.
71. 1966 S.C. Acts 3294, No. 1293, § 4, subsection 3.
72. 284 S.C. at 87-88, 326 S.E.2d at 399.
73. Brief of Appellant-Respondent at 11.
74. 284 S.C. at 88, 326 S.E.2d at 399.
75. Id. at 88, 326 S.E.2d at 399. The opinion written by the trial judge was adopted,
as modified, by the supreme court.
76. Duke argued that its contract with Greenwood County did not perpetually
freeze some residents' rates because the PSC retained jurisdiction to alter the contract's
terms in the public interest. The two dissenters, Justices Gregory and Littlejohn, ap-
peared to agree with this argument. See 284 S.C. at 103-04, 326 S.E.2d 407-08 (Little-
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tion of the Act authorizing the sale of the electrical system was
constitutional, but the portion freezing the rates at their 1966
level for certain Greenwood residents was an unconstitutional
special law that was prohibited by article III, section 34 of the
South Carolina Constitution.
77
The court agreed with Duke that Act 1293 of 1966 was "spe-
cial" because it treated certain locations in Greenwood County
more favorably than others and had no general application
throughout the state.78 The court, however, noted a major excep-
tion to the general rule that article III, section 34, prohibits spe-
cial laws only where general laws can be made applicable.7 9
john, C.J., dissenting); id. at 102-03, 326 S.E.2d at 407 (Gregory, J., dissenting). The
court, however, declared that the intent of the parties governed, and the clear intent of
the parties at the time of contracting was that the 1966 residents would enjoy the old
rates with no time limit. Id. at 89, 326 S.E.2d at 399-400.
Duke also claimed that Act 1293 violated the equal protection clauses of both the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 3 of the
South Carolina Constitution. Id. at 93, 326 S.E.2d at 402. The court rejected this claim.
Its rationale was similar to the rationale it used in rejecting the "special legislation"
argument. Id. at 94-96, 326 S.E.2d at 402-04.
Duke further challenged the rates under S.C. CODE ANN. § 58-27-840 (1976), which
prohibits discriminatory utility rates. The court held that Duke, having worked in 1965
and 1966 to further passage of Act 1293 and to get Greenwood County voter approval for
the sale of the electrical system (voter approval was another condition of the sale), was
estopped to challenge the validity of the statute. 284 S.C. at 99, 326 S.E.2d at 405 (citing
South Carolina & W. Ry. v. Ellen, 95 S.C. 68, 78 S.E. 963 (1913); 16 Am. Jur. 2d Consti-
tutional Law § 207-09 (1979)).
The court also disposed of the claim of individual petitioners who alleged discrimi-
natory rates under S.C. CODE ANN. § 58-27-840 (1976). The court held that the individu-
als had no standing to challenge the dual rate structure. 284 S.C. at 96-98, 326 S.E.2d at
404.05. The individuals failed to show, other than by speculation, that their rates would
decrease if the rates of the pre-1966 Greenwood residents were increased. The petition-
ers, therefore, had no individual stake in the litigation. Id.
77. Id. at 36 (emphasis added). Article III, § 34 of the South Carolina Constitution
states in pertinent part:
The General Assembly of this state shall not enact local or special laws
concerning any of the following subjects or for any of the following purposes to
wit:
IX. [W]here a general law can be made applicable, no special law shall be
enacted ...
X. The General Assembly shall forthwith enact general laws concerning
said subjects for said purposes, which shall be uniform in their operation: Pro-
vided, that nothing contained in this section shall prohibit the General Assem-
bly from enacting special provisions in general laws.
S.C. CONsT. art. III, § 7.
78. 284 S.C. at 91, 326 S.E.2d at 401.
79. Id. at 91-92, 326 S.E.2d at 401; accord Shillito v. City of Spartanburg, 214 S.C.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
When the General Assembly has constitutional authority to leg-
islate specifically or directly in an area, the prohibition of article
III, section 34, subsection IX, does not apply.s0 The General As-
sembly has specific constitutional authority to regulate utilities
under article IX, section 1 of the South Carolina Constitution."1
Therefore, the court reasoned that article III, section 34, was in-
applicable to the General Assembly's decision to sell a county-
owned utility system to a private company. 2
The principle underlying the court's decision in Duke
Power, that legislation which affects only one locale or county is
not necessarily unconstitutional special legislation, is well
grounded in South Carolina precedent8 3 At the opposite ex-
treme, however, the supreme court has held that legislation
which affects twenty-three counties in the state may be an im-
permissible local law.8 4 Consequently, no litmus test exists for
determining the number of counties a law must affect to avoid
the "special legislation" label.
In the past, the court has struck down a local law when a
uniform law already existed. The court has interpreted the exis-
tence of a general law as evidence that the legislature believes
that a uniform approach to the problem is practicable and desir-
able. 5 In Duke Power the court found no general law covering
the sale of a county's electrical system to a private utility. The
court, therefore, found no inconsistency in enforcing Act 1293 of
1966.
As noted by one commentator, "the constitutional lore of
11, 51 S.E.2d 95 (1948); see Sansing v. Cherokee County Tourist Camp Bd., 195 S.C. 7,
10 S.E.2d 157 (1940); Townsend v. Richland County, 190 S.C. 270, 2 S.E.2d 777 (1939).
80. 284 S.C. at 91, 326 S.E.2d at 401 (citing City of Columbia v. Smith, 105 S.C. 348,
89 S.E. 1028 (1916)).
81. S.C. CONST. art. IX, § 1 provides: "The General Assembly shall provide for ap-
propriate regulation of common carriers, publicly owned utilities, and privately owned
utilities serving the public as and to the extent required by the public interest."
82. 284 S.C. at 92, 326 S.E.2d at 401.
83. See Kalk v. Thornton, 269 S.C. 521, 238 S.E.2d 210 (1977)(provision in new mu-
nicipal incorporation statute to limit statute's operation to incorporation proceedings be-
gun after specific date held valid, although statute only affected certain area in Horry
County); see also Timmons v. S.C. Tricentennial Comm'n, 254 S.C. 378, 175 S.E.2d 805
(1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 986 (1971).
84. Dean v. Spartanburg County, 59 S.C. 110, 37 S.E. 226 (1900).
85. J.L. Underwood, supra note 68, at 172; see State v. McIver, 270 S.C. 242, 241
S.E.2d 747 (1978); Gillespie v. Blackwell, 164 S.C. 115, 161 S.E. 869 (1932); State v. Ferri,
111 S.C. 219, 97 S.E. 512 (1918).
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special legislation has long been murky and confusing."86 Early
courts noted specious distinctions." Although sound principles
support the result reached in Duke Power, equally valid princi-
ples could have been found to support the opposite result. The
court, nevertheless, held that the provisions of Act 1293 of 1966,
which created a dual rate structure for electricity users of
Greenwood County as part of the sale of its electrical system to
Duke Power Company, was valid. The sale of Greenwood's elec-
trical system was a unique problem that lent itself to special
treatment by the legislature. When encountered with similar di-
lemmas, the legislature may enact "special" legislation, even
though this legislation provides for disparate treatment of South
Carolina residents. This gives the legislature the flexibility nec-
essary to meet the localized needs of its constituents.
J. L. Rogers, Jr.
86. Horrack, Special Legislation: Another Twilight Zone, 12 IND. L.J. 109
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